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This study has 2 objectives: (a) to explore typical paths of cognitive development associated with aging,
terminal decline, and dementia and (b) to promote and illustrate an individual-oriented approach to the
study of cognitive aging based on longitudinal panel data from a population-based sample (N ! 500; age
rangeT1 ! 60–80, where T refers to time) tested at 3 occasions 5 years apart. Results document
interindividual differences in multivariate patterns of change. Although cognitive changes generally
covary, the present study indicates that subgroups of individuals develop along different paths charac-
terized by selective changes in subsets of cognitive functions. Typical progression of dementia followed
a developmental cascade from low declarative memory, via low functioning across all observed cognitive
measures, to dementia diagnosis, and finally, death.
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This study had two objectives: (a) to explore typical paths of
cognitive development associated with aging, terminal decline,
and dementia in old age and (b) to encourage an individual-
oriented approach to the study of cognitive aging. Because this
approach is relatively nonstandard in cognitive aging research, it
might be appropriate to outline some of its features.
An individual-oriented approach to the study of development is
not new; on the contrary, key characteristics of this approach have
been delineated by proponents of a person-oriented perspective
(e.g., Allport, 1937; Bergman, Magnusson, & El-Khouri, 2003;
Block, 1971; Magnusson, 2001), life span developmental theore-
ticians and methodologists (e.g., Baltes & Nesselroade, 1979;
Baltes, Reese, & Nesselroade, 1977; see also Hertzog, 1985;
Lo¨vde´n & Lindenberger, 2005; Molenaar, Huizenga, & Nessel-
roade, 2003), and developmental systems theoreticians (e.g., Ford
& Lerner, 1992; Gottlieb, 1992; Wohlwill, 1973; see also S.-C. Li,
2003). Broadly viewed, four related perspectives guide the
individual-oriented agenda.
First, understanding development requires a multivariate and
interactionist perspective, viewing individuals, or subsystems at
different levels, as indivisibles. Rather than standing for them-
selves, the significance of different parts in a system like cognition
is held to emerge from interactions among the parts and from the
role the parts play in the total functioning of the system. In other
words, an individual’s level of performance on a particular ability
needs to be interpreted in the context of this individual’s ability
profile. The intraindividual performance profile is, from this per-
spective, the essential indivisible unit of analysis (e.g., Bergman et
al., 2003; Magnusson, 2001). For example, low episodic memory
ability may have different developmental meanings for individuals
with high or low semantic memory.
Second, individuals can be described as open systems, contin-
uously variable, and achieving more or less stable equilibria
through, among other principles, self-organization. In other words,
individual development is viewed as a dynamic process in which
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certain states (value patterns) function as attractors and tend to
occur frequently in a sample of individuals (e.g., Bergman &
Magnusson, 1997). Furthermore, a system’s state at time t is held
to be dependent, linearly or nonlinearly, on its state at time t – 1.
In other words, change from t –1 to t is dependent on the prior state
of the system (e.g., Smith & Thelen, 2003).
The third point highlights that standard measurement models,
such as standard cross-sectional and longitudinal factor analyses,
are concerned with interindividual differences. Therefore, these
models tell us little about how variables are related within indi-
viduals (e.g., Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003;
Jones & Nesselroade, 1990; Molenaar et al., 2003). For example,
a strong association between sensory functioning and processing
speed, as revealed by an analysis of interindividual differences
(e.g., Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997), does not prescribe how these
variables are coupled within individuals (cf. K. Z. H. Li & Lin-
denberger, 2002).
The fourth perspective questions an implicit acceptance of a
“uniformity-of-nature assumption” (Borsboom et al., 2003, p.
215). That is, standard multivariate statistics and much of the
accompanying theory assume that structural relations among vari-
ables are homogeneous over individuals. Several lines of evidence
concerning cognitive change in old age illustrate the problems with
an overly strong reliance on this assumption. For example, Sliwin-
ski, Hofer, and Hall (2003) showed that correlations among age-
based cognitive changes were higher in a group of individuals with
preclinical dementia, as compared with a group of nondemented
individuals. The moderate correlations among changes observed in
the mixed sample were partly attributable to the aggregation of
these two subgroups. Further sources of heterogeneity of develop-
ment in older samples include age-related change versus mortality-
associated change (e.g., Bosworth & Schaie, 1999; Kleemeier,
1962; Riegel & Riegel, 1972; Singer, Verhaeghen, Ghisletta, Lin-
denberger, & Baltes, 2003; Small, Fratiglioni, von Strauss, &
Ba¨ckman, 2003). To illustrate, Singer et al. (2003) derived cross-
sectional age gradients in processing speed and knowledge at
baseline from a sample (n! 516; age rangeT1! 70–103) that was
followed up on after 4 and 6 years. Age gradients for two different
subsamples were compared: gradients for the total sample and for
a sample of individuals who survived and participated in all
follow-up waves (n ! 132). The former sample included partici-
pants in closer proximity to death and more participants suffering
from health disorders, whereas the latter consisted of select and
relatively healthy individuals. Negative age gradients were ob-
served for processing speed in both subsamples, but knowledge did
only decline significantly in the total sample. Thus, decline in
processing speed accompanied by stable knowledge might be a
normatively age-related multivariate developmental path, whereas
decline in both abilities might be associated with impending death
(see also Small et al., 2003). Of course, if concerted declines in
speed and knowledge were primarily mortality related, one would
expect most individuals to sooner or later enter this developmental
path. Hence, as widely recognized, an age-based analysis may
conceal developmental patterns that are common across individu-
als (e.g., Wohlwill, 1970). Specifically, the central question in
cognitive aging research—“Does it all [cognitive functions] go
together when it goes?” (Rabbitt, 1993, p. 385)—may have dif-
ferent answers for different people: It might go together for some,
or even for most individuals, but not necessarily for all, and, for
different individuals, it might all go together at different chrono-
logical ages. Such heterogeneity in developmental trajectories will
go unnoticed as long as researchers tacitly rely on methods that
endorse rather than test the uniformity-of-nature assumption.
The perspectives guiding the individual-oriented approach are
not about statistical issues per se—they are about adopting a
particular perspective for the study of development. Statistical
issues come into play when choosing a measurement model or an
empirical design that matches the perspective. From what has been
said above, such an individual-oriented methodological approach
should preferably capture the dynamic, multivariate, and interac-
tionist nature of individual development; clearly separate intrain-
dividual and interindividual differences; and explicitly structure
heterogeneity.
In light of the above considerations, it can be argued that
understanding development demands the study of each individu-
al’s multivariate intraindividual change, followed by careful gen-
eralization based on a combination of several such studies. Em-
pirically, such an approach means collecting many variables,
within several individuals, many times. Couched within the con-
text of studying short-term changes in behavior, this multivariate,
single-subject, repeated measures design has been advocated by,
for example, Nesselroade (e.g., Jones & Nesselroade, 1990; Nes-
selroade & Ford, 1985) and Molenaar (e.g., Molenaar et al., 2003),
but the design is also at the core of studying long-term individual
development (e.g., Nesselroade & Ghisletta, 2000; Valsiner,
1984). For example, intensive short-term longitudinal information
might be necessary for separating between short-term fluctuations
in behavior and more enduring changes (Nesselroade & Salthouse,
2004). However, researchers are rarely fortunate enough to possess
such intensive longitudinal information. Furthermore, interest in
interindividual differences and the existence of a great number of
ongoing longitudinal studies featuring many older individuals,
many variables, but only a few assessments that are widely sepa-
rated in time motivates an attempt to come closer to the desirable
measurement model with other methods.
Pattern-oriented methods offer one possible avenue. Many such
methods aim at classifying individuals into homogeneous groups
on the basis of similarities among individuals’ profiles of values on
the variables under study. Examples include longitudinal config-
ural frequency analysis (von Eye, 1990), methods based on cluster
analyses (e.g., Bergman et al., 2003; see Schaie, 1989, for an
example of cognitive aging research), latent profile analysis, latent
class analysis, and the longitudinal extension, latent transition
analysis (e.g., Collins & Wugalter, 1992). All of these methods
attempt to grasp the extent and nature of sample heterogeneity in
multivariate patterns of change. Furthermore, whereas many stan-
dard multivariate approaches may represent heterogeneity with
multigroup models or by including interaction terms, the pattern-
based approach offers an alternative for structuring unknown het-
erogeneity and interactions.
Recent developments in the multilevel modeling and latent
growth curve modeling frameworks offer other methodological
avenues (see Collins & Sayer, 2001; Little, Schnabel, & Baumert,
2000; Muthe´n & Muthe´n, 2000, for overviews). These approaches
combine the classic growth curve modeling approach with the
pattern-oriented approach; to not only represent, but also structure
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interindividual differences in change (e.g., Muthe´n & Muthe´n,
2000; see also Nagin & Tremblay, 2001). For example, one group
may have a linear growth curve, whereas another group may
follow a quadratic curve.
The methodological approaches summarized above all have
their advantages, limitations, and assumptions. In this study, we
opt for a pattern-oriented approach based on cluster analysis.
Bergman (1998; Bergman et al., 2003) developed such a procedure
for the analysis of long-term longitudinal panel data: linking of
clusters after removal of a residue (LICUR). To the procedure’s
advantages belong robustness, flexibility, suitability for long-term
longitudinal panel data, and the substantive questions posed in this
study. Moreover, in contrast to the often univariate nature of the
recent developments in the growth curve modeling framework, it
is inherently a multivariate approach. Briefly, the procedure in-
cludes an attempt, at each measurement occasion (or age), to form
clusters (i.e., groups) of individuals who are homogenous (with
respect to the value pattern on the included variables) within a
cluster but heterogeneous across clusters. Then, the different clus-
ters are matched across time (e.g., the time t clusters are matched
to the t " 1 clusters) and typical individual transitions across
clusters are studied over time. Though results are summarized at a
group level, the procedure is person oriented because individuals
belonging to the same cluster at a given measurement occasion
have approximately the same intraindividual pattern of values. The
intraindividual pattern for an individual at one assessment is then
related to the intraindividual pattern at a later assessment.
Substantively, the first major research question addressed in this
article concerns the debate about the degree to which age-related
changes in different cognitive functions are independent of each
other. Support for a relatively unitary account of cognitive aging
has primarily come from cross-sectional studies of age-
heterogeneous samples showing that age differences in many
cognitive abilities are well predicted by the shared variance among
these abilities and by interindividual differences in biomarkers
such as sensory functioning (e.g., Anstey & Smith, 1999; Linden-
berger & Baltes, 1994; Luszcz & Bryan, 1999; Salthouse & Czaja,
2000; Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997; but see Allen et al., 2001;
Hofer, Berg, & Era, 2003; Hofer & Sliwinski, 2001; Lindenberger
& Po¨tter, 1998; Schmiedek & Li, 2004). Similarly, results from
several longitudinal studies suggest that, although interindividual
differences in change are relatively limited in select samples
relatively free from pathology, correlations among changes in
different cognitive abilities tend to be high (e.g., Hultsch, Hertzog,
Dixon, & Small, 1998; Lo¨vde´n, Ro¨nnlund, et al., 2004; Wilson et
al., 2002).
As previously noted, the debate regarding the prominence of a
general factor in cognitive aging has often been implicitly framed
in the context of a strong uniformity-of-nature assumption, in the
sense that structural associations across cognitive variables have
been assumed to be invariant across individuals (but see Singer et
al., 2003; Sliwinski, Hofer, & Hall, 2003). To provide a different
perspective on this issue, we explored intraindividual multivariate
patterns of change with the expectation of finding typical patterns
consistent with concerted cognitive change for some individuals
but, for other individuals, also patterns consistent with selective
change in a subset of the included measures.
A second main empirical question concerned a major source of
interindividual and intraindividual differences in cognitive devel-
opment in old age: dementia. Cognitive impairments several years
prior to diagnosis have been shown to be sensitive markers of later
diagnosis (i.e., preclinical deficits; e.g., Ba¨ckman, Laukka, Wah-
lin, Small, & Fratiglioni, 2002; Ba¨ckman, Small, & Fratiglioni,
2001; Elias et al., 2000; Fabrigoule et al., 1998; Jacobs et al., 1995;
Small, Herlitz, Fratiglioni, Almqvist, & Ba¨ckman, 1997; see
Spaan, Raaijmakers, & Jonker, 2003, for a review focused on
memory). Preclinical cognitive deficits tend to be rather global
(e.g., Ba¨ckman et al., 2002; Fabrigoule et al., 1998), but impair-
ments in episodic memory are perhaps the most prominent finding
(e.g., Ba¨ckman et al., 2001; Small et al., 1997). Furthermore, it has
been suggested that impairments in functions that are normally
well preserved in old age, such as semantic memory, may distin-
guish dementia from aging (e.g., Branconnier, Cole, Spera, &
DeVitt, 1982; Hodges & Patterson, 1995; Small et al., 1997; see
also Spaan et al., 2003). A main empirical objective of this study
was to explore typical multivariate cognitive states preceding
dementia diagnosis, with the expectation of finding such states to
be characterized by global deficits. Furthermore, we aimed at
exploring typical 10-year developmental paths toward dementia
diagnosis. On the basis of the expected proximal preclinical pattern
of global cognitive deficits, we expected that developmental paths
from a still relatively differentiated cognitive system, but possibly
low declarative memory functioning (i.e., episodic and semantic
memory), toward low functional levels across the system would be
typical for the long-term preclinical progression of dementia.
Finally, terminal decline, denoting an association between prox-
imity to death and cognitive performance (Kleemeier, 1962; Riegel
& Riegel, 1972), constitutes another important source of interin-
dividual and intraindividual differences in old age. Several studies
suggest that cognitive changes associated with terminal decline
may reflect other causal structures than age-related changes; for
example, specific cognition-influencing diseases and global break-
downs of the biological system (see Berg, 1996; Small & Ba¨ck-
man, 1999, for overviews). As noted above, several recent studies
have also suggested that the multivariate cognitive pattern of
change in the terminal decline phase may differ from age-related
changes. Specifically, the terminal decline phase may be charac-
terized by a pattern of global cognitive change, including decline
in crystallized abilities such as semantic memory, which may be
relatively unaffected by aging-related processes (e.g., Singer et al.,
2003; Small et al., 2003; see also Lo¨vde´n & Lindenberger, 2005).
Therefore, a final empirical objective was to provide further
knowledge concerning the multivariate patterns of change in ter-
minal decline.
The data considered in this study emanate from the first, second,
and third measurement occasions, each separated by 5 years, of the
Betula study (Nilsson et al., 1997, 2004). The sample was popu-
lation based and included 500 individuals at baseline (age range !
60–80). All individuals were initially free from dementia diagno-
sis. We included cognitive measures that were selected to represent
major building blocks and products of the cognitive system: broad




For detailed information concerning the overall design of the Betula
study, participant characteristics of the original samples, and the specific
test procedures, see Nilsson et al. (1997) and Nilsson et al. (2004). Only
methodological features pertinent to this study are described below.
Participants
The sample was restricted to five cohorts: 60, 65, 70, 75, and 80 years
old at time of first assessment (T1). At T1, this sample consisted of 500
individuals, 100 in each cohort. All participants were recruited by random
sampling from the population registry in Umeå, a city with about 100,000
inhabitants in Northern Sweden. Individuals were excluded if they (a) had
a dementia diagnosis, (b) suffered from mental retardation, (c) suffered
from severe sensory handicaps, or (d) had another language than Swedish
as their native tongue.
Nilsson et al. (1997) compared participants in the Betula study (n !
1,000 in the total T1 sample) and nonparticipants (contacted individuals
unwilling to participate; n ! 481) on a number of background variables.
The results showed no differences between participants and nonpartici-
pants on most of the variables included, but participants were employed to
a greater extent and had higher incomes. As compared with the general
population in Sweden, participants had higher levels of education and
higher incomes, which is expected from the fact that a university is located
in Umeå. Thus, the general impression was that the sample is highly
representative of the target population.
Five years later, at the second assessment (T2), the effective sample was
reduced to 387 participants. That is, 113 individuals (22.6%) were unwill-
ing or unable to return for the complete T2 assessment. Ten years later, at
the third assessment wave (T3), 225 participants remained in the effective
sample. Summary characteristics of the sample as a function of measure-
ment occasion are displayed in Table 1. Note that the means for the
cognitive variables are relatively stable over measurement occasions,
which is attributable to longitudinal selectivity effects. Because the main
analyses focus on these effects, we performed no standard selectivity
analysis.
We explored three different reasons for not being included in the
effective sample at each assessment wave: death, dementia diagnosis, and
experimental dropout (i.e., refusal, moved, ill, not available, or missing
values on all relevant measures). Individuals in a dead category died at
some point prior to a follow-up assessment (i.e., T2 or T3). Naturally, this
category absorbed individuals who at a prior occasion (i.e., T2) belonged
to the other two categories (i.e., dropout and dementia diagnosis). Individ-
uals in the dementia group received a dementia diagnosis in connection or
prior to a specific measurement occasion. The individuals with dementia
diagnosis were difficult to test with the Betula cognitive battery, which
resulted in unacceptable amounts of missing values on the variables in-
cluded in this study. Therefore, this category absorbed individuals from the
effective sample. Furthermore, to the extent it was possible to establish
whether a dementia diagnosis had been issued external to the study, the
category absorbed individuals from the group of individuals dropping out
between any two occasions for experimental reasons. Because it has lately
been suggested that vascular dementia and Alzheimer’s disease share many
features (e.g., Kalaria & Ballard, 1999)—the cognitive impairments are, for
example, strikingly similar (e.g., Almqvist, Fratiglioni, Agu¨ero-Torres,
Viitanen, & Ba¨ckman, 1999)—we chose to treat the dementia cases as a
single category (cf. Ba¨ckman et al., 2002; Fabrigoule et al., 1998). Indi-
viduals classified as experimental dropouts were still alive at a specific
occasion and, to the extent it was possible to ascertain, nondemented—but
they were unwilling or unable to participate for some other reason.
Out of the 113 individuals not included in the effective sample at T2, 48
were dead, 27 had a dementia diagnosis, and 38 belonged to the experi-
mental dropout category. Out of the 275 individuals not tested at T3, 73
belonged to the experimental dropout category, 149 were dead, and 53 had
a dementia diagnosis. Summary characteristics of the dropout groups are
included in the Results section (see Table 4, which will be discussed later
in the text).
A dementia diagnosis was established by the following procedure. First,
screening criteria narrowed down the number of participants to be consid-
ered for extensive diagnosis evaluation. Specifically, those fulfilling one or
more of the following criteria were referred to a specialist in neuropsychi-
atry: (a) suspected dementia signs observed by the nurse or the psycholo-
gist serving as experimenters, (b) a Mini-Mental State Exam score (Fol-
stein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) below 24, and (c) a decline of three or
more Mini-Mental State Exam points over the 5-year follow-up intervals.
On the basis of further extensive examination and the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) criterion, a neuropsychiatrist made the
decision whether a clinical diagnosis of dementia was warranted. Among
those who refused or were unable to participate in an assessment wave,
medical records, available from various clinics including psychiatry, neu-
rology, and geriatrics, were examined to establish whether a dementia
diagnosis had been issued external to the study.
Procedure and Measures
At all three assessment waves, the measures were collected during two
test sessions, both which lasted for about 1.5 to 2 hr for each participant.
The first session consisted mainly of health examination and question-
naires. The second session comprised an extensive cognitive measurement
battery. All participants were tested individually and were requested to use
hearing aids or glasses if used. We selected Block Design (Wechsler,
Table 1
Summary Characteristics for the Effective Sample at Each Measurement Occasion
Variable
T1 (N ! 500)a T2 (N ! 387)b T3 (N ! 225)c
M SD M SD M SD
Age 70.0 7.1 74.1 7.0 76.7 6.4
Years of education 8.0 3.1 8.1 3.2 8.4 3.2
MMSE 27.3 2.1 26.9 2.4 27.3 1.9
Block Design 50.0 10.0 49.0 10.2 48.4 9.7
Episodic memory 50.0 10.0 48.8 11.2 50.6 10.6
Semantic memory 50.0 10.0 50.5 10.4 51.1 9.5
Note. T ! time; MMSE ! Mini Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975).
a nmen ! 240 and nwomen ! 260. b nmen ! 182 and nwomen ! 205. c nmen ! 102 and nwomen ! 123.
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1981), four measures of episodic memory, and four indicators of semantic
memory as measures of cognitive performance. The individual indicators
of semantic and episodic memory were selected because of their satisfac-
tory psychometric properties and longitudinal availability (cf. Lo¨vde´n,
Ro¨nnlund, et al., 2004; Ro¨nnlund, Nyberg, Ba¨ckman, & Nilsson, 2005).
Block Design. The obtained raw scores from the Block Design test
from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Revised (Wechsler, 1981)
were used. In this task, participants are, under speeded conditions, required
to place red and white blocks such that they form the same pattern shown
on a target paper.
Episodic memory functioning. Three measures of recall performance
and one measure of recognition performance were used as indicators of
episodic memory functioning (cf. Nyberg et al., 2003). In the study phase,
each participant was presented with two consecutive lists of imperatives
(e.g., roll the ball) presented at the rate of 8 s per item. The nouns in the
sentences belonged to eight semantic categories, with four items in each.
During study of one of the lists, participants were requested to perform the
action described by the imperatives, using an object corresponding to the
noun (enacted condition). The first measure of recall was a free recall test
that followed after each list, and the measure used was the number of
sentences (correct verb and noun) recalled in the enacted condition. After
the free recall tests described above, participants were given the eight
category names into which the nouns could be divided, as cues to remem-
ber the nouns. The second measure of recall was the number of nouns
(cued) recalled from the enacted condition, and the third measure included
was the number of nouns (cued) recalled from nonenacted condition. After
an interval of approximately 30 min, filled with other cognitive tests (e.g.,
the Block Design test described above), the participant was orally and
visually presented with the previously studied nouns, intermixed with not
previously encountered nouns. The participant indicated whether he or she
recognized a noun. The number of hits minus the number of false alarms
from the nonenacted condition was used as the fourth measure.
Semantic memory functioning. One measure of verbal knowledge and
three measures of verbal fluency were used as indicators of semantic
memory functioning (cf. Nyberg et al., 2003). The knowledge measure was
derived from a 30-item multiple-choice synonym test (Dureman, 1960).
Participants selected a synonym to each target word from five alternatives.
The total number of correctly selected synonyms in 7 min yielded a
measure of verbal knowledge. The first verbal fluency measure was the
total number of words with the initial letter A generated in 1 min. The
second measure was the total number of professions with the initial letter
B generated in 1 min. The third measure represented the total number of
five-letter words with the initial letter M generated in 1 min.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Previous cross-sectional (Nyberg et al., 2003; see also Ro¨nnlund
et al., 2005) and longitudinal (Lo¨vde´n, Ro¨nnlund, et al., 2004)
confirmatory factor analyses of the Betula data have provided
support for partitioning the declarative memory measures into
measures of episodic and semantic memory, based on a similar set
of individual measures included here.1 In addition, these analyses
confirmed both configural and metric measurement invariance
across the adult life span (Nyberg et al., 2003) and over time in old
age (Lo¨vde´n, Ro¨nnlund, et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the empirical
background for using the memory measures as indicators of se-
mantic and episodic memory should be confirmed for this sample,
time period, and selection of measures. To this end, we specified
a standard longitudinal confirmatory factor model (Hertzog &
Schaie, 1986; cf. Lo¨vde´n, Ro¨nnlund, et al., 2004) including two
factors (episodic memory and semantic memory; see the Method
section for the respective indicators) times three occasions. Data
for these analyses were provided by the sample of participants who
survived and participated at T3 (n! 225). This model captured the
structure in the data well, !2(207, N ! 225) ! 307.03, compara-
tive fit index ! .967, root-mean-square error of approximation !
.046. Furthermore, forcing longitudinal metric invariance in the
estimated factor loadings did not significantly degrade the fit,
!2(219, N ! 225) ! 317.05, comparative fit index ! .968,
root-mean-square error of approximation ! .045; #!2(12, N !
225) ! 10.02, p $ .61. Thus, metric invariance over time was
found to be an acceptable hypothesis. The loadings of the indica-
tors on the episodic memory factor were all significant and high
(.57–.67 at T1). All loadings on the semantic memory factor were
significant and they were high for both the verbal fluency (.49, .66,
and .74 at T1) and verbal knowledge (.77 at T1) measures. There-
fore, on the basis of standard psychometric criteria, the measures
included in the present analyses are valid indicators of semantic
and episodic memory.
Performance on the Block Design task is often construed as
measuring spatial visualization ability but also loads highly on
higher-order fluid intelligence constructs such as Cattell’s (1971)
Gf (e.g., Carroll, 1993). Taken together, the present measures tap
important aspects of the basic products of cognition: fluid intelli-
gence (Block Design), crystallized abilities (semantic memory),
and episodic memory. The cross-sectional age gradients at T1
support this view: The age correlation was higher for Block Design
(–.44) than for a unit-weighted composite of the episodic memory
measures (–.36) and a semantic memory composite (–.28). Fur-
thermore, the partial correlation with years of formal education,
controlling for age, was higher for semantic memory (.42) than for
episodic memory (.27) and Block Design (.35). Thus, the measures
showed similar divergent validity with respect to age and socio-
biographical associations as those displayed by measures of crys-
tallized and fluid abilities (e.g., Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997).
By standardizing each individual measure, summing the mea-
sures for each construct separately, and standardizing the sums to
the T metric (M! 50; SD! 10), we formed three variables (Block
Design, episodic memory, and semantic memory) to be included in
the cluster analyses. The T1 sample provided reference values for
all occasions. All analyses were performed, and all results are reported
in this metric. As shown in Table 2, the 5- and 10-year test–retest
correlations are high for all three composites, suggesting lower
reliability boundaries of the three variables that are acceptable.
For the cluster analyses, the statistical package SLEIPNER was
utilized and the LICUR procedure was followed (Bergman, 1998;
Bergman et al., 2003). The first step in this procedure is to identify
a residue of outliers separately at each measurement occasion (see
Bergman, 1998, for rationale). The participants in the residue are
held dissimilar to all other participants. In this study, a participant
whose value profile in Block Design, episodic memory, and se-
mantic memory has an averaged squared euclidean distance
1 As compared with the Lo¨vde´n Ro¨nnlund, et al. (2004) and Ro¨nnlund
et al. (2005) articles, which reported two-occasion longitudinal data, two
indicators (one for each construct) were dropped because they were not
measured at T3.
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(ASED) of at least 100 to all other participants’ value profiles was
considered as such an individual. However, neither at T1, T2, or
T3 did the residue analyses locate any outliers. Thus, all available
individuals were cluster analyzed.
Typical Profiles of Cognitive Functioning in Old Age
The second step in LICUR is to perform cluster analyses separately
for the data from each measurement occasion (nT1! 500; nT2! 387;
nT3 ! 225). The scores in Block Design, episodic memory, and
semantic memory constituted the value profile to be analyzed. The
method for cluster analysis was Ward’s (1963) hierarchical agglom-
erative method with squared euclidean distances. The guidelines es-
tablished in LICUR for choosing the number of clusters were applied:
(a) A sudden drop in the explained error sum of squares (EESS) of the
solution may indicate that a suboptimal number of clusters have been
reached, (b) the accepted solution has to be meaningful and the last
cluster fusion judged not to obliterate two distinct and theoretically
interpretable clusters, (c) the number of clusters should preferably not
be more than 15 and cannot normally be expected to be fewer than 5,
and (d) the EESS should preferably exceed 67%. EESS is computed
as follows: EESS! 100% (total ESS – ESS of cluster solution)/total
ESS, where ESS is the error sum of squares. This measure corre-
sponds to a measure of “explained variation.” In the interpretation of
the cluster solutions we focus on the cluster centroids; that is, the
profile of the means in the three variables for each cluster. At all three
time points, the criteria described above indicated that a six-cluster
solution was acceptable.
To study stability of the clusters over time, one needs a proce-
dure for comparing the similarity of the different sets of centroids
(in our case, the centroids from T1 and T2, from T2 and T3, and
from T1 and T3 were compared). The pairwise matching proce-
dure in LICUR first computes the ASED between each pair of
centroids, with one centroid coming from the first analysis and the
other centroid coming from the second analysis. Then, the two
most similar ones become the first match; the two most similar
ones among the remaining centroids become the second match and
so on until all centroids have been matched. An ASED lower than
the average of all within-cluster ASEDs (i.e., the homogeneity
coefficient) for a well-functioning cluster solution with homoge-
nous clusters can be regarded as an acceptable match. Bergman et
al. (2003) has suggested a limit for the homogeneity coefficient at
100 and, as desirable, 50 (for the T metric). For considering a
match as acceptable, we applied the more stringent level.2
The ASEDs between the centroids at the different time points
are summarized in Table 3. The ASEDs between matched cen-
troids are in bold. It is evident from Table 3 that structural stability
is quite high. In fact, only one marginally acceptable match is
found (Cluster A2 with Cluster C2, where A refers to T1 and C
refers to T3; ASED ! 77). In other words, similar centroids are
found at all three time points.
Typical Developmental Paths of Cognitive Functioning in
Old Age
After the centroids had been matched over time, the individuals’
cluster membership was cross-tabulated across solutions (i.e., T1
with T2, T2 with T3, and T1 with T3). The experimental dropout,
dead, and dementia categories at T2 and T3 were also included in
these cross-tabulations. For each cell, we examined whether the
cell frequency was significantly higher than expected by chance,
indicating a typical developmental path. An exact hypergeometric
test was used for this purpose (Bergman & El-Khouri, 1987). We
applied an alpha level at .01 (one-tailed) for the expected cells
corresponding to no change in cluster belonging and to transitions
2 To our knowledge, no methods exist for examining the sampling
variance of the centroids generated by cluster solutions or for significance
testing ASED coefficients between two cluster solutions. Therefore, it is
appropriate to address the issues of this aspect of reliability with replication
across methods and samples. Such analyses are reported in the Reliability
and Validity section.
Table 2
Correlations Among Block Design, Episodic Memory Performance, and Semantic Memory
Performance
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Time 1
1. Block Design —
2. Episodic memory .41 —
3. Semantic memory .50 .52 —
Time 2
4. Block Design .75 .37 .46 —
5. Episodic memory .37 .70 .52 .40 —
6. Semantic memory .42 .50 .81 .45 .53 —
Time 3
7. Block Design .72 .43 .39 .74 .41 .42 —
8. Episodic memory .31 .66 .46 .37 .72 .52 .47 —
9. Semantic memory .44 .50 .80 .46 .52 .80 .46 .56 —
Note. n ! 225. Test–retest correlations are in bold. All correlations are significant at p & .001.
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from overall below-mean performance to a dropout category. To
guard against the mass significance fallacy, we applied an alpha at
.001 (one-tailed) for all other cells.
The main results of this study are shown in Figure 1. The figure
displays the centroids for the different clusters sorted from left to
right by measurement occasion, and sorted from top to bottom (a)
by ascending mean levels at T1, (b) by the match between T1 and
T2, and (c) by the match to T2 at T3. It is evident in this figure that
similar clusters are found at the three time points. The arrows
connecting clusters from different measurement occasions repre-
sent typical developmental paths, operationally defined as transi-
tion probabilities that are more likely than expected by chance.
Demographic characteristics for the different clusters and the drop-
out categories are summarized in Table 4. From this table, it is
apparent that the average chronological age of individuals at a
given measurement occasion varies across clusters; that is, certain
profiles are more common among older individuals (e.g., Cluster
A6), whereas other profiles are more common among younger
individuals (e.g., Cluster A1). Nevertheless, to make valid infer-
ences about developmental changes, we need to focus on longitu-
dinal patterns, defined as typical developmental paths over time.
These patterns are most clearly discernible in Figure 1.
First, all six T1–T2 cluster pairs and all six T2–T3 cluster pairs
show significant individual stability. For example, if an individual
starts in Cluster A1 at T1, he or she is 6.1 times (36/5.9) more
likely than expected by chance to belong to Cluster B1 (where B
refers to T2) at T2. Thus, the general impression is that individuals
who do not drop out of the study tend to keep their configuration
of the cognitive system over time.
Second, at least three typical developmental paths representing
intraindividual change in cognitive profile exist: (a) to start in Cluster
A5 and end up in Cluster B6, indicating a major drop in Block Design
but otherwise minor changes; (b) to start in Cluster B2 and end up in
Cluster C1, signaling a major increase in Block Design and episodic
memory; and (c) to start in Cluster B3 and end in Cluster C5,
indicating a major loss in episodic memory but otherwise minor
changes. A fourth typical path of individual change is to start in
Cluster A2 and end up in Cluster B3, indicating loss in semantic
memory but otherwise no large changes. However, Cluster A2 and
Cluster B3 are rather similar (ASED ! 14), and this path is perhaps
best interpreted as indicating stability. Considering the intraindividual
change paths in the context of those representing stability suggests
that subgroups of individuals from originally cognitively homogenous
subgroups develop differently from each other.
Third, individuals in closer proximity of dementia diagnosis
(&5 years prior to diagnosis) are typically characterized by the
lowest levels of functioning in the sample on all parts of the
considered cognitive system (i.e., Clusters A6 and B6). In addition,
a typical more distal profile preceding dementia diagnosis (5–10
years prior) is to possess relatively low declarative memory func-
tioning (i.e., episodic and semantic memory) but perform around
the mean of the sample on Block Design (i.e., Cluster A5 to
dementia at T3). It is interesting that it is also typical to start in this
dementia-preceding cluster (A5) and end up in Cluster B6 at T2,
indicating a loss in Block Design. Together, these patterns may
suggest that the developmental path from a relatively differentiated
cognitive system, but low declarative memory functioning, toward
a profile of lowest functional level across the entire system is a
likely typical path of long-term preclinical progression of dementia.
Fourth, Cluster A6, being lowest in the sample throughout the
considered cognitive system at T1, is typically preceding dying
between T2 and T3. In other words, individuals in this cluster are
typically closer to death than others. It is interesting that the
cognitive profile indicated by this cluster does not appear to
immediately precede dying (i.e., neither between Cluster A6 at T2
nor between Cluster B6 at T3). However, individuals in this cluster
are typically receiving a dementia diagnosis within 5 years, and
dementia diagnosis is, not surprisingly, typically followed by
death. Thus, the path from Cluster A6 and later death is likely
associated with dementia diagnosis.
Replication After Statistically Controlling for Associations
to Chronological Age
As previously noted, some profiles are more common among
older individuals, whereas some profiles are more common among
Table 3
Averaged Squared Euclidean Distances (ASEDs) Between the Centroids from the Three Cluster Solutions (Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3)
Cluster B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 HC
A1 2 128 113 315 253 672 17 274 146 418 214 920 67
A2 58 24 14 87 136 359 20 77 25 162 84 545 64
A3 147 121 16 92 54 243 102 125 38 115 29 388 56
A4 310 104 64 3 84 86 214 30 66 7 44 183 71
A5 380 218 131 74 17 62 299 128 169 58 22 139 64
A6 790 429 341 138 212 8 642 222 347 73 199 8 61
B1 10 254 135 407 220 918 78
B2 56 36 61 157 122 531 75
B3 59 77 7 110 52 437 54
B4 205 14 69 12 55 203 65
B5 212 144 146 106 9 254 68
B6 537 171 293 51 136 20 84
HC 99 36 40 48 82 49
Note. ASEDs of matched clusters are in bold. A, B, and C indicate the cluster solutions corresponding to Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3, respectively. HC!
homogeneity coefficient.
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Figure 1. Centroids of the clusters and significant typical developmental paths of cluster membership. Solid
arrows indicate significant paths at p & .001 (one-tailed), and dashed arrows indicate p & .01 (one-tailed).
Numerals next to an arrow indicate the observed and expected frequency, respectively. By design, individuals
in the dementia group cannot transfer to the dropout group. With this exception only, all naturally possible
degrees of freedom are included in the cross-tabulation. Significant T1 to T3 developmental paths are only
shown if they apply to the dropout, dementia, or dead groups. In the graphs, the ordinate denotes T-scores (M !
50, SD ! 10), with T1 providing reference values. A, B, and C indicate the cluster solutions corresponding to
Time 1 (T1), Time 2 (T2), and Time 3 (T3), respectively. BD ! Block Design; EPM ! episodic memory;
SEM ! semantic memory.
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younger individuals. That is, we observed cross-sectional mean
age differences among clusters of individuals within each of the
three measurement occasions. Because individuals were grouped
into homogenous clusters based on their cognitive profile, rather
than age, this age heterogeneity of the clusters does not jeopardize
the interpretability of typical developmental paths (see the Discus-
sion section). Nevertheless, it is informative to know the extent to
which the cluster profiles identified in this study were dependent
on the presence of age-associated variance in the cognitive vari-
ables. This applies especially to the results involving Cluster A6,
because individuals in this cluster are on average older than the
mean age of the sample (see Table 4). To address the issue, we
performed cluster analysis on data from T1 after statistically
removing the association between each cognitive variable and
chronological age by regressing the cognitive variables on age and
using the residuals in the cluster analysis. The analysis produced
clusters similar to the analysis of the original data: An acceptable
match between the centroids obtained in the two analyses was
found for all six centroids (Mdn ASED ! 13, range ! 5–34).
Furthermore, the pattern of findings with respect to preclinical
dementia profiles was identical to the original analyses. Specifi-
cally, if an individual started in Cluster A6 at T1, he or she was 3.2
times ( p& .001) more likely than expected by chance to belong to
the group of individuals diagnosed for dementia at T2. The pattern
obtained with age-residualized data also matched the original
finding that Cluster A6 typically precedes impending death be-
tween T2 and T3. The high degree of similarity between the
original and the age-residualized pattern of results invalidates the
objection that the original pattern was induced by cross-sectional
age differences.
Reliability and Validity
It is important to evaluate the quality and trustworthiness of
cluster solutions. We addressed this issue in several ways. First, for
each cluster, the homogeneity coefficient should be considerably
lower than the averaged ASED when all individuals belong to the
same cluster (for our T score metric, this distance is 200; owing to
scaling by T1 values, it is 225 at T2 and 198 at T3). As a rule of
thumb, clusters with coefficients under 100 can be considered as
Table 4
Demographic Characteristics for the Clusters and for the Dropout, Dead, and Dementia Categories
Group
n
Chronological age (T1) Years of education (T1)
T1 (A) T2 (B) T3 (C) T1 (A) T2 (B) T3 (C)
T1 (A) T2 (B) T3 (C) M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Cluster 1 60 49 50 66.3* 5.8 64.6* 5.4 63.0* 4.4 11.1* 4.1 11.2* 4.0 10.3* 3.7
Men 34 25 29
Women 24 24 21
Cluster 2 115 35 22 68.1* 7.1 69.0 7.8 67.5 6.9 8.9* 3.4 9.1 3.0 9.3 3.1
Men 52 16 8
Women 63 19 14
Cluster 3 63 99 41 66.4* 6.1 66.4* 5.7 66.5* 6.0 7.6 2.4 8.2 2.7 8.6 3.7
Men 27 47 14
Women 36 52 27
Cluster 4 136 67 44 72.6* 6.5 70.4 6.6 69.2 6.4 7.2* 2.3 7.8 3.4 7.1 1.7
Men 58 27 17
Women 78 40 27
Cluster 5 85 54 53 71.1 6.6 69.3 7.4 65.8* 6.2 7.0* 2.0 7.5 2.3 7.9 2.7
Men 49 33 28
Women 36 21 25
Cluster 6 41 83 15 75.2* 6.2 74.0* 5.5 73.3 4.9 6.0* 1.3 6.6* 1.8 6.5 1.8
Men 20 34 6
Women 21 49 9
Dropout 38 73 70.8 6.2 70.3 6.6 8.5 3.1 8.0 2.8
Men 21 30
Women 17 43
Dead 48 149 73.3* 7.2 73.9* 6.4 7.3 3.2 7.4 2.8
Men 27 86
Women 21 63
Dement 27 53 75.7* 4.9 72.8* 5.4 6.7 1.5 8.0 3.5
Men 10 22
Women 17 31
All 500 500 500 70.0 7.1 70.0 7.1 70.0 7.1 8.0 3.1 8.0 3.1 8.0 3.1
Men 240 240 240
Women 260 260 260
Note. A, B, and C indicate the cluster solutions corresponding to Time 1 (T1), Time 2 (T2), and Time 3 (T3), respectively.
* p & .01 (for a z test with the total sample treated as the null hypothesis population).
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acceptably homogeneous (Bergman et al., 2003). The homogeneity
coefficients indicated that all clusters were reasonably homoge-
nous (MdnT1 ! 64; rangeT1 ! 56–71; MdnT2 ! 72; rangeT2 !
54–84; MdnT3 ! 48; rangeT3 ! 36–99).
Second, we computed the EESS for each cluster solution. A
value of above 67% can be regarded as satisfactory (e.g., Bergman
et al., 2003). The EESS of the cluster solutions was 67.8 at T1,
69.6 at T2, and 68.1 at T3. In other words, two thirds of the
variation is explained by the classifications.
Third, it might be useful to demonstrate that the obtained cluster
solutions cannot be regarded as having arisen from an analysis of
a similar data set in which all relationships have been removed.
Therefore, we performed the same type of cluster analysis that was
done on the real data set on 20 random data sets, constructed by
random permutation of the columns of the original data set. To
consider the solution we originally obtained as warranting a sub-
stantive interpretation, we demanded that its EESS should be
higher than that of any of the 20 corresponding figures obtained
from the random data sets. That is, if this is the case, we reject the
null hypothesis that the solution we actually obtained is consistent
with a hypothesis of no relationships in the data, at the 5% level.
This procedure for significance testing is principally similar to that
of testing a correlation coefficient. The significance tests of the
cluster solutions at T1, T2, and T3 all indicated significant
structures.
Fourth, in a control analysis with T1 data, a different method of
cluster analysis was used (the median method; Hartigan, 1975) to
verify that its centroids matched those of the main analysis using
Ward’s (1963) method. The two sets of centroids matched nicely
(Mdn ASED ! 11; range ! 4–75).
Fifth, we compared the T1 centroids derived from the longitu-
dinally studied sample with the centroids obtained from a proce-
durally identical cluster analysis of an independent validation
sample, tested for the first time at T2 (n! 500; Mdn age! 70; age
range ! 60–80). The measures for the validation sample were
standardized to the T metric according to the means and standard
deviations from the longitudinal sample at T1. An acceptable
match between the centroids obtained in the two samples was
found at least for five of the centroids (Mdn ASED ! 6, range !
2–29). The centroid not replicated (A5) had an ASED of 120 to its
counterpart in the validation sample.
Discussion
Two major findings result from the present person-oriented
analysis of longitudinal cognitive changes in old age. First, most
individuals not dropping out from the study tended to keep their
cognitive profile over time. Second, a minority of individuals
followed typical (i.e., nonrandom) developmental paths of intra-
individual change in cognitive profiles. Together, these two find-
ings confirm our central hypothesis that subgroups of individuals
develop differently from each other, but the results are also con-
sistent with earlier univariate results demonstrating relatively high
time-based stability of interindividual differences in intraindi-
vidual change in old age (e.g., Hultsch et al., 1998; Lo¨vde´n,
Ro¨nnlund, et al., 2004). It is interesting that proponents of general
and process-specific views of cognitive aging both have tended to
tacitly accept the assumption that cognitive aging is uniform in the
sense that structural relations among tasks and underlying cogni-
tive processes are invariant across individuals. The present find-
ings question this assumption by demonstrating interindividual
differences in intraindividual multivariate patterns of change.
Some or even most individuals might undergo senescent changes
in intellectual performance in a relatively global manner, but
others may experience selective changes in a subset of cognitive
functions. This is not to be understood as if the results suggest that
there are no levels of analysis where a uniformity-of-nature as-
sumption holds, or as if general mechanisms of development are
not of primary interest. However, to better understand cognitive
aging, it may be necessary to investigate its antecedents at the level
of the individual and to allow for interindividual variability in the
importance of different biological and sociocultural mechanisms
(cf. Lo¨vde´n & Lindenberger, 2005).
Several results concerning the developmental progression of
dementia were obtained. A typical early preclinical dementia pro-
file was characterized by relatively low episodic and semantic
memory but mean level performance on Block Design. This result
is consistent with previous studies highlighting episodic memory
deficits in the preclinical stages of dementia (e.g., Ba¨ckman et al.,
2001; Small et al., 1997) and with studies suggesting that deficits
in cognitive functions that are relatively intact in old age (in this
study, semantic memory) may distinguish dementia from aging
(Branconnier et al., 1982; Small et al., 1997; see also Spaan et al.,
2003). Individuals in the later preclinical stages, however, are
typically characterized by the lowest levels of functioning in the
sample throughout the considered cognitive system (see also Ba¨ck-
man et al., 2002; Fabrigoule et al., 1998). Together with the typical
developmental path from the early to the late preclinical profile
(i.e., Cluster A5 to Cluster B6), the results describe the preclinical
phase of dementia as a development from relatively low declara-
tive memory functioning toward a profile of globally low func-
tional levels. These results illustrate the importance of considering
that the nature of the preclinical profile may predictably change as
a function of proximity to today’s diagnosis criteria. For early and
reliable diagnosis of dementia, such dynamic information may add
important information to static information.
No profile appeared to directly precede death. However, being
low across the considered cognitive system (i.e., belonging to
Cluster A6) was typically associated with dying within the 10-year
frame of this study; that is, individuals in this cluster were typically
closer to death than the others. It is interesting that it was also
typical to start out in this cluster and become demented within 5
years, and, not surprisingly, dementia was typically followed by
death. Taken this pattern together with the description of the
preclinical dementia phase, the results describe a developmental
cascade of low declarative memory, low functioning across the
considered cognitive system, dementia diagnosis, and finally
death. In a sense, this path of cognitive development is mortality
related, but the results suggest that dementia to some extent hide
behind this relation in this sample, or alternatively, that individuals
in a terminal decline phase often might be diagnosed for dementia.
It is always important to evaluate the trustworthiness of empir-
ical findings, but because the methods applied here are nonstand-
ard in cognitive aging research, we devoted particular effort to this
task. The results indicated that the clusters were reasonably ho-
mogenous, that the cluster solutions cannot be regarded as arisen
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from an analysis of random data, that a different method of cluster
analysis yielded similar centroids, and that five out of six centroids
were externally replicated. In addition, the fact that the centroids
replicate across time adds credibility to the quality of the solutions.
On the basis of these methodological efforts, the reliability and
validity of the results can be judged satisfactory.
A major reason for choosing the LICUR procedure for our
individual-oriented approach was its robustness and suitability for
the analysis of long-term longitudinal panel data. We also think
that the procedure incorporates some of the central messages from
the individual-oriented approach: It naturally reflects the dynamic,
multivariate, and interactionistic nature of individuals’ cognitive
development; it clearly incorporates a direct methodological at-
tempt to structure unknown heterogeneity; and it separates and
relates intraindividual and interindividual differences. Accord-
ingly, the procedure fosters a data-analytic perspective that
matches the individual-oriented theoretical agenda more closely
than most other data-analytic approaches to long-term longitudinal
panel data such as longitudinal factor analysis. The procedure also
covers a wider range of applications than the one presented here.
For example, it can test whether certain developmental transitions
occur less rather than more frequently than expected by change
(e.g., antitypical transitions; von Eye, 1990; see also Bergman et
al., 2003). To illustrate, the processing speed theory (Salthouse,
1996) would predict that potential developmental paths represent-
ing decrements in perceptual speed accompanied by stability or
increase in other cognitive abilities should be less frequently
observed than expected by chance. Furthermore, the procedure
naturally focuses on sequential multivariate changes, such as the
preclinical developmental cascade reported here, that are more
difficult to identify with traditional longitudinal methods.
At the same time, cluster-analytic procedures such as LICUR
are not without limitations, and it might be appropriate to dwell a
while on them. Cluster analyses are often criticized for ambiguity
in choosing the number of clusters. Though the LICUR stopping
rules have proved useful to overcome this problem (e.g., Bergman,
1998; Bergman et al., 2003), the clusters must not be interpreted to
represent the only possible or existing types of cognitive profiles in
old age. However, if hierarchical cluster analysis is used, as
was the case here, there is a strong correspondence between the
cluster solution with c clusters and with c " 1 clusters, with the c
cluster solution resulting from the fusion of two clusters in the c"
1 solution and with all the other clusters being identical. Indeed,
stepping up or down one level in hierarchy of clusters does not
change any of the substantive results reported here. In this sense,
the issue is less critical than the corresponding problem for stan-
dard factor analysis, where the number of factors chosen often
provides the fundamental empirical basis for theoretical
conclusions.
In light of our individual-oriented approach, the interpretation of
the cluster centroids should be clarified: Because the values on the
variables are standardized with the sample as reference, they
cannot be interpreted in an absolute intraindividual sense. To
illustrate, the centroid of low declarative memory performance but
normal Block Design performance (Cluster A5) cannot be inter-
preted as if these individuals’ fluid abilities are better functioning
than their declarative memory in the absolute sense. In other
words, because behavioral sciences generally lack the tools of
absolute scales, each value has to be interpreted with reference to
the sample (see Bergman et al., 2003, for an overview). A related
scaling problem could be principally applied to the interpretation
of developmental paths: Most of the individual changes in cogni-
tive profile constitute ordinal interactions. As such, these changes
cannot, in the strict sense, be unambiguously interpreted (e.g.,
Dunn & Kirsner, 1988; Loftus, 1978). Of course, this scaling
problem has plagued behavioral sciences for a long time and is by
no means specific to this study.
Out of commonly acknowledged validity threats to longitudinal
studies, retest effects have probably received least attention (but
see Lo¨vde´n, Ghisletta, & Lindenberger, 2004; Rabbitt, Diggle,
Smith, Holland, & McInnes, 2001; Ro¨nnlund et al., 2005; Schaie,
1988, 1996). From previous research with the cognitive battery in
Betula, we know that 5-year retest effects are present at least for
episodic memory but not for our semantic memory variable
(Ro¨nnlund et al., 2005). Overall, the effect is small (0.15 SD).
Though we cannot rule out that retest effects have influenced the
present results, these effects are unlikely to have affected the
observed cluster solutions and cluster transitions in a substantial
manner.
Note also that, owing to abundant missing values stemming
from difficulties in testing individuals with dementia, we were not
able to include these individuals in the cluster analyses. This
means that the measurement model, rather that empirically explor-
ing it, a priori assumes that these individuals belong to a homo-
geneous group different from individuals included in the analy-
sis3—and that the cognitive pattern and developmental path after
and immediately before diagnosis is unknown. These aspects ob-
viously further underscore that it is worthwhile to invest consid-
erable resources into minimizing missing data.
Finally, we note that each cluster analysis at each measurement
occasion was performed on an age-heterogeneous sample. Cer-
tainly, this feature leads to a confounding of chronological age
with the profiles within each cluster analyses. For example, the
individuals in the clusters characterized by globally low perfor-
mance (Clusters A6, B6, and C6) were on average older than the
mean age of the sample. Considering that the prevalence of de-
mentia increases dramatically with age in this age range, one might
argue that the reason why individuals in these clusters typically
developed dementia is the age of the individuals in the clusters.
However, the analyses on data statistically controlled for the
association to chronological age recovered similar centroids at T1
and produced identical patterns of results with respect to dementia.
Thus, the present results are not artifacts of cross-sectional age-
related variance. Furthermore, chronological age does not, obvi-
ously, cause dementia and does not, in itself, contain any explan-
atory capacity. Surely, the state of the cognitive system must be
closer to the causal structures behind dementia than time passed
since birth. In other words, when it comes to studying cognitive
aging, we generally prefer to give interpretational priority to indi-
viduals’ patterns of cognitive functioning over chronological age.
In doing so we echo classic calls for replacing chronological age
with variables closer to the developmental process of interest
(Wohlwill, 1970; see also Lo¨vde´n & Lindenberger, 2005; S.-C. Li
3 We thank P. B. Baltes for drawing our attention to this point.
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& Schmiedek, 2002; Sliwinski, Hofer, Hall, Buschke, & Lipton,
2003). The spirit of dynamic systems theories (e.g., Ford & Lerner,
1992; Gottlieb, 1992; Wohlwill, 1973) inherent in the LICUR
procedure, reflected by allowing the cross-sectional cognitive pro-
files to determine both future cognitive states and developmental
paths, offers a viable methodological basis for such endeavors.
To conclude, the individual-oriented approach advocates a focus
on the individual that captures the multivariate and dynamic nature
of individual development, clearly separates intraindividual and
interindividual differences, and structures heterogeneity. The dem-
onstrated methodological approach is not necessarily the best one
in terms of implementing these messages. Combinations of
variable-oriented and pattern-oriented approaches, although often
of univariate nature, are promising approaches to the direct struc-
turing of developmental change, and these methods may some-
times be preferred over the “snapshot and linking” procedure
applied here. The multivariate, single subject, repeated measures
design (Jones & Nesselroade, 1990) is a necessary tool for better
understanding intellectual aging. In a similar vein, measurement
bursts might be necessary for providing empirical information that
captures the dynamic properties of behavior and for separating
more enduring change from short-term fluctuation in behavior
(Nesselroade & Salthouse, 2004). However, the LICUR procedure
is a relatively robust and flexible approach to analyzing longitu-
dinal panel data and deserves a place among the individual-
oriented tools in the basic tool chest. In this study, the procedure
demonstrated systematic interindividual differences in multivariate
patterns of change. Furthermore, the results described the progres-
sion of dementia as a developmental cascade of low declarative
memory, low functioning across the considered system, dementia
diagnosis, and, finally, death.
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